Experimental Evidence for Quantum Structure in Cognition

We proof a theorem that shows that a collection of experimental data of membership weights of items with respect to a pair of concepts and its conjunction cannot be modeled within a classical measure theoretic weight structure in case the experimental data contain the effect called overextension. Since the effect of overextension, analogue to the well-known guppy effect for concept combinations, is abundant in all experiments testing weights of items with respect to pairs of concepts and their conjunctions, our theorem constitutes a no-go theorem for classical measure structure for common data of membership weights of items with respect to concepts and their combinations. We put forward a simple geometric criterion that reveals the non classicality of the membership weight structure and use experimentally measured membership weights estimated by subjects in experiments to illustrate our geometrical criterion. The violation of the classical weight structure is similar to the violation of the well-known Bell inequalities studied in quantum mechanics, and hence suggests that the quantum formalism and hence the modeling by quantum membership weights can accomplish what classical membership weights cannot do.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figure

Classical Logical versus Quantum Conceptual Thought: Examples in Economics, Decision theory and Concept Theory

Inspired by a quantum mechanical formalism to model concepts and their disjunctions and conjunctions, we put forward in this paper a specific hypothesis. Namely that within human thought two superposed layers can be distinguished: (i) a layer given form by an underlying classical deterministic process, incorporating essentially logical thought and its indeterministic version modeled by classical probability theory; (ii) a layer given form under influence of the totality of the surrounding conceptual landscape, where the different concepts figure as individual entities rather than (logical) combinations of others, with measurable quantities such as 'typicality', 'membership', 'representativeness', 'similarity', 'applicability', 'preference' or 'utility' carrying the influences. We call the process in this second layer 'quantum conceptual thought', which is indeterministic in essence, and contains holistic aspects, but is equally well, although very differently, organized than logical thought. A substantial part of the 'quantum conceptual thought process' can be modeled by quantum mechanical probabilistic and mathematical structures. We consider examples of three specific domains of research where the effects of the presence of quantum conceptual thought and its deviations from classical logical thought have been noticed and studied, i.e. economics, decision theory, and concept theories and which provide experimental evidence for our hypothesis.Comment: 14 page

Natural Sample Spaces and Uncertain Belief

This article proposes a novel framework for understanding judgments of probability. Both accurate and inaccurate judgments are conceptualized in terms of the sets of information, or sample spaces, on which they are based. When appropriate sample spaces are easily accessed from memory (e.g., when they correspond to natural cognitive categories), people will make relatively accurate judgments; otherwise, people may substitute more accessible but inappropriate sample spaces and make judgment errors. In 3 experiments, the sample space framework was applied to account for the base rate fallacy. Results showed that (a) people spontaneously access sample spaces that correspond to natural categories, (b) reliance on inappropriate sample spaces produces the base rate fallacy, and (c) highlighting appropriate sample spaces improves the sensitivity of people's judgments to base rates. Discussion extends the framework to explain accuracy and error in other judgment domains.link_to_subscribed_fulltex